Abstract-A cognitive radio (CR) system with retrial possibility and an admission cost for secondary users (SUs) to join the retrial group is investigated in this paper. If the SU finds the primary user (PU) band unavailable, it must decide with a probability estimate to either enter a retrial group or give up its service and leave the system. SUs in the retrial group independently retry after an exponentially distributed random time until they successfully access the spectrum. When the PU arrives, the SU's service on the band is interrupted. This interrupted SU is then assumed to occupy the PU band immediately when the PU completes its service. First, the noncooperative joining behavior of SUs that choose to maximize their benefit in a selfish distributed manner is investigated, and an inefficient Nash equilibrium is derived. Second, from the perspective of the social planner, the socially optimal joining strategy when SUs cooperate with each other is studied, and the corresponding Nash equilibrium is exactly derived. Finally, the result that an individually optimal strategy, in general, does not yield the socially optimal strategy is theoretically verified. Furthermore, to bridge the gap between the individually and socially optimal strategies, a novel strategy of imposing an admission fee on SUs to join the retrial group is proposed and investigated with the derivation of an optimal value for the admission fee. The numerical analysis indicates that the proposed admission fee as an equilibrium strategy and the socially optimal strategy of SUs improve efficiency in the utilization of the CR system. Index Terms-Cognitive radio (CR), dynamic spectrum access, noncooperative game, retrial queue, social optimization.
PUs. Thus, CR networks can support an intelligent and efficient dynamic spectrum by enabling SUs to opportunistically access the channels unused by PUs. A flurry of research on CR networks has emphasized the technical aspects of spectrum sharing (e.g., spectrum sensing, dynamic spectrum access protocol, and resource allocation; see, for example, [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] ).
Based on the concept of dynamic spectrum sharing, opportunistic spectrum access can be classified as centralized and decentralized cognitive medium access control protocols. In the case of centralized dynamic spectrum access, a central controller makes the decision on the spectrum access for all SUs. However, with decentralized or distributed dynamic spectrum access, an SU can make a decision on spectrum access independently and autonomously. This paper focuses on the joining behavior of SUs as well as the corresponding Nash equilibrium in CR networks where SUs are strategic (see [9] and [10] for surveys on this topic in the queueing literature). In the case of decentralized dynamic spectrum access, SUs are noncooperative and allowed to make their own decisions, which can be viewed as a game among the SUs, and the fundamental problem is to identify the Nash equilibrium joining strategy. In contrast, with centralized dynamic spectrum access, we are looking for the cooperative strategy designed by a central controller that then maximizes the overall welfare of SUs. Several studies in the literature (e.g., [11] [12] [13] ) address this issue by studying the social optimization strategy and the individual optimal strategy of SUs with game theory under different levels of system information, but these strategies provide limited insights regarding the decentralized behavior of SUs because the SUs are constrained to form a queue while only the head of the queue can sense idle channels (i.e., in a firstcome, first-served (FCFS) fashion). However, this limitation does not essentially characterize the congestion among SUs. Additionally, if an arriving SU is placed at the end of the queue, it will impose no negative externalities on the SUs already in the system.
Even so, in practice, the blocked SUs may not be served according to the FCFS discipline, and a newly arriving SU can impose negative externalities on the other SUs in the system because of random competition for access among the SUs. In fact, fair medium access for an unused spectrum band can be accomplished by using techniques such as carrier sensing, random backoff, and control message exchange, and the SUs competing for the same band are equally likely to gain access. To overcome the drawback of previous works, in this paper, we model the CR system as a retrial queueing system with server breakdowns, where SUs compete for access independently as retrial customers. The PU band can be considered a server, and the PU has the higher priority over all SUs. When the PU emerges, it will occupy the PU band immediately regardless of whether the band is serving an SU or in an idle state. This kind of retrial can be regarded as a backoff in wireless communication systems. We will offer an extensive study of the Nash equilibrium and the socially optimal strategies for all SUs. Moreover, to use the PU band more efficiently and eliminate the difference between the equilibrium and the socially optimal strategies, we suggest a novel approach to imposing an appropriate admission fee for SUs that decide to join the orbit. This way, it is feasible to induce individually optimizing SUs to behave in a socially optimal way.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the strategic behavior of SUs is studied with a retrial phenomenon in CR networks from a game theory point of view. In the queueing literature, a few papers (e.g., [14] [15] [16] [17] ) have dealt with the economic analysis of the strategic behavior of customers in the single queue system where the server is subject to breakdowns but without retrial phenomena. Recently, Economou and Kanta [18] studied retrial queueing systems with a constant retrial policy in which the customers in the retrial group are served with the FCFS discipline, and Wang and Zhang [19] investigated the equilibrium and socially optimal balking strategies of customers under both unobservable and observable cases with a classic retrial policy but both without server breakdowns. This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the basic model. In Section III, we obtain the steady-state solutions to the model and derive the mean number of SUs in the retrial group conditional on the state of the PU band. In Section IV, we consider the SUs' optimization problem in the noncooperative environment and derive the Nash equilibrium joining strategy of the SUs when they arrive and find an unavailable PU band. Section V considers maximization of the overall welfare of society from the perspective of the social planner by assuming that all of the SUs are cooperative. Section VI compares the solutions for individual optimization and social optimization. Meanwhile, we propose an appropriate admission fee to narrow the gap between the two strategies. Section VII provides numerical examples. Finally, the conclusions are set out in Section VIII.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
We consider a CR system with a single PU band. This PU band can be considered as a server that serves the single PU or SUs. In this system, SUs can opportunistically access the spectrum band if that band is not occupied by a PU or another SU. In other words, as long as the PU band is idle, spectrum access by an SU is allowed, and it remains transparent to the PU due to the higher priority of the PU. That is, whenever the PU requires service, the PU band will stop serving SUs, although the band may be occupied by an SU at that time. Furthermore, we assume that the interrupted SU does not join the orbit but waits at the server and will occupy the PU band immediately when the PU completes its service. Therefore, the PU band can be in four states: idle, occupied by an SU, occupied by the PU with one preempted SU, and occupied by the PU with no preempted SU.
Whenever the PU uses the PU band, its sojourn times are random and exponentially distributed with rate β. The interarrival times of the PU are also exponential with rate α. The SUs arrive in the system according to a Poisson process with the potential arrival rate λ. We assume that the SUs are served with service times that are exponentially distributed, with a rate μ and with the absence of the PU.
Upon arrival, each SU can sense the PU band and learn whether the PU band is idle or not. That is, the SU does not know whether the PU band is occupied by the PU or an SU when it is found to be unavailable. However, the SU also does not know how many other SUs are presently attempting to use the PU band. Each arriving SU must decide on spectrum access based on the partial information of the PU band, namely, to balk or enter the system and use the PU band eventually. Moreover, the SU decisions are irrevocable, which means that retrials of balking customers and reneging of entering customers are not allowed. When the SU decides to enter the system, if the PU band is idle, then the SU immediately occupies the PU band; otherwise, if the PU band is found to be unavailable, the SU goes into a virtual waiting room (called an orbit) with infinite capacity and becomes a repeated user. Each repeated SU produces a Poisson flow of retrials with rate θ, independently of other SUs, until it completes service, after which, it leaves the system and has no further effects on that system. We assume that the interarrival times of SUs, service times of SUs, intervals between repetitions of SUs, interarrival times of the PU, and sojourn times in the PU band of the PU are mutually independent.
When an SU decides to enter the system, the waiting time in the system will incur a cost (this cost is accumulated from arrival in to leaving the system). We denote by C the penalty per time unit for the delay of SUs in the system. If the SU finishes its job, then it will receive a reward of R. It follows from the work of Wang et al. [20] that the generalized service time of an SU, which is defined as the length of time since the SU began to access the spectrum until its job is completed, is (1/μ)(1 + (α/β)); thus, the cost incurred during the generalized time is (C/μ)(1 + (α/β)), independent of the SUs' strategy, and one can subtract it from R. Therefore, without loss of any generality, we assume that waiting costs are incurred only for the time stayed in the retrial orbit. Throughout this paper, we denote by ρ 1 = λ/μ and ρ 2 = α/β the traffic intensity of SUs and the PU, respectively. For convenience, we also introduce ρ = ρ 1 (1 + ρ 2 ), ρ θ = θ/μ, andā ≡ 1 − a for any real number a ∈ [0, 1]. Fig. 1 describes the network topology, and Table I summarizes the notations used in this paper.
All SUs are assumed to be strategic and risk neutral. We will consider two scenarios. One is that SUs are noncooperative; that is, they wish to maximize their own expected benefit, which leads to the conclusion that all SUs must choose the Nash equilibrium joining strategy. The other is that if an SU cooperates, it will attempt to maximize the total expected benefit of all SUs. Recall that there is no cost since SUs begin to access the radio spectrum, and therefore, if an arriving SU finds the PU band idle, it prefers to enter and occupies the PU band immediately, regardless of whether SUs are noncooperative or cooperative because it has a positive net benefit R. Thus, entering is a dominant strategy of such an SU, which does not need to take into account the strategies of any other SUs. In the following sections, we concentrate our study on the behavior of SUs that find the PU band unavailable. In the present model, there are two pure strategies: to join or to balk. A mixed strategy is specified by the joining probability of an arriving SU that finds the PU band unavailable.
Denote by I(t) the state of the PU band at time t. The events I(t) = 0, 1, 2, or 3 correspond to the states that the PU band is idle, occupied by an SU, occupied by the PU with one interrupted SU at the server, or occupied by the PU with no interrupted SU at the server, respectively. Let N (t) be the number of SUs in the orbit at time t. It is readily seen that the stochastic process {(I(t), N(t)), t ≥ 0} is a 2-D continuous-time Markov chain with state space {0, 1, 2, 3} × {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Suppose that all SUs are indistinguishable and follow a mixed strategy "enter with probability q while observing an unavailable PU band and balk with probability 1 − q." Then, the effective arrival rate is λq for states where the PU band is not idle, and the transition rate diagram is shown in Fig. 2 . Using a similar argument in the work of Kulkarni and Choi [21] , we can show that the system is stable if and only if qρ < 1.
III. STEADY-STATE SOLUTIONS
To study noncooperative and cooperative strategies of arriving SUs in the CR system, we first need to investigate the performance of the system if all SUs choose to enter with prob- ability q when arriving and finding the PU band unavailable. When the system is stable, we let p(i, j) be the steady-state probability of state (i, j). The balance equations are presented below for j = 0, 1, 2, . . .
where
Equations (1)- (4) are to be solved by using the generating function technique. We define the partial generating functions, i.e.,
The following Theorem 1 provides exact expressions for the probabilities that the PU band is idle, occupied by an SU, occupied by the PU with one preempted SU, or occupied by the PU with no preempted SU and the mean numbers of SUs in the orbit when the PU band is idle, occupied by an SU, occupied by the PU with one preempted SU, or occupied by the PU with no preempted SU, respectively. The proof for this theorem is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 1:
In the CR system in the steady state, in which all SUs enter with probability q when they arrive finding the PU band unavailable, we have the following results.
1) The probabilities that the PU band is idle, occupied by an SU, occupied by the PU with one preempted SU, or occupied by the PU with no preempted SU are, respectively, given by
2) The mean numbers of SUs in the orbit when the PU band is idle, occupied by an SU, occupied by the PU with one preempted SU, or occupied by the PU with no preempted SU are, respectively, given by
Remark 1: It is not surprising that each probability of result 1) in Theorem 1 for those four probabilities is independent of θ. In fact, the stationary distribution of the server (namely, the PU band in the current paper) does not depend on the rate of retrial, as explained by Falin and Templeton in [22, pp. 12 and 13] .
IV. NONCOOPERATIVE STRATEGY
If all SUs are selfish, their goal is to maximize their own expected benefit. At the instant of their arrival, they have to assess their expected waiting costs when finding the PU band unavailable against their reward associated with receiving service and decide whether to join or not. Specifically, the SUs strictly prefer to enter if the reward for service exceeds the expected cost for waiting in the orbit and are indifferent between entering and balking if the reward is equal to the cost. Each SU's behavior will affect other SUs' decision, as well as the performance of the CR system. Therefore, this system can be modeled as a symmetric noncooperative game among SUs, and the fundamental problem is to identify the Nash equilibrium in the competitive environment.
We now consider an SU that arrives and finds the PU band unavailable; that is, the PU band is either occupied by the PU or occupied by an SU, but the SU does not know the exact state of the unavailable PU band. If this SU decides to join the orbit, its cost accumulates until it successfully gains access to the spectrum. Next, we calculate the expected time that an SU waits in the orbit if it enters when finding the PU band unavailable upon arrival.
Theorem 2 provides exact expressions for the expected (conditional) waiting time of an arriving SU, given that it sees upon arrival that the PU band is unavailable and decides to join the orbit. The proof for this theorem is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 2: The expected (conditional) waiting time of an arriving SU, given that it sees upon arrival that the PU band is unavailable and decides to join the orbit, is given by
Moreover, T (q) is strictly increasing for q. Remark 2: It should be noted that the SUs in orbit (retrial space) cannot be aware of the status of the server (PU band). This is a main difference between the retrial queues and classic queues. As a result, the SUs will stay in orbit even when the server is idle. The idle status of the server will be terminated only when one of the SUs successfully retries. Thus, the N in (24) should be
Based on the reward structure previously mentioned, the expected net benefit of an arriving SU if it finds the PU band unavailable and decides to enter is
It follows from Theorem 2 that S(q) is strictly decreasing for q. Now, the equilibrium behavior of the SUs when they arrive and observe an unavailable PU band can be studied. It should be noted that it is possible that ρ < 1 or ρ ≥ 1 when the system is stable, i.e., qρ < 1. In the sequel, we will consider the mixed strategy in two cases: ρ < 1 and ρ ≥ 1. The former case is investigated in the following theorem, and the latter case is given in Theorem 4. The proof for Theorem 3 is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 3: In the considered CR system with ρ < 1, a unique Nash equilibrium mixed strategy "enter with probability q e while observing the PU band unavailable" exists, where q e is given by
Because S(q) is a decreasing function, whenever the joining probability q of other SUs when they arrive and find the PU band unavailable is smaller than q e , the expected net benefit of a tagged arriving SU if it enters is positive; thus, the unique best response is 1. For the similar reason, the unique best response of the tagged SU is 0 if q > q e . Moreover, any strategy is a best response if q = q e . This shows that an individual's best response is a decreasing function of the strategy selected by the other SUs, that is, the higher the joining probability selected by the others, the lower is one's best response. This type of behavior is dubbed by Hassin and Haviv [9] as "avoid the crowd."
In the same manner, for the case ρ ≥ 1, an analogous result for determining the equilibrium joining strategy of SUs is given as follows.
Theorem 4: In the considered CR system with ρ ≥ 1, a unique Nash equilibrium mixed strategy "enter with probability q e while observing the PU band unavailable" exists, where q e is given by
where q ee and T (0) are given by (17) and (18), respectively.
V. COOPERATIVE STRATEGY
We now turn our interest to the analysis of the optimal joining strategy of SUs from a social point of view that maximizes the overall welfare of SUs per time unit. When SUs are noncooperative, they usually competitively access the radio spectrum. However, the performance of the CR network can be improved if the SUs cooperate with each other to achieve optimal spectrum access.
The social benefit per time unit when all SUs follow a mixed policy "enter with probability q while observing an unavailable PU band upon arrival" is
where λ * is the mean arrival rate for the SUs that decide to enter the CR system, and N is the mean number of SUs in the orbit, which is given by (43). Using (6)-(9) and the Poisson Arrivals See Time Averages (PASTA) property, we have
Substituting (43) and (22) into (21), we obtain
We now consider the problem that is to maximize the social benefit over q, i.e., to find the socially optimal joining probability q * of SUs when they arrive and find the PU band unavailable. The major result for this is given in Theorem 5, and the corresponding proof for this theorem is given in Appendix D. Based on Theorem 5, we will prove that there exists a unique socially optimal joining strategy, and the result is given in Theorem 6.
Theorem 5: In the considered CR system with ρ < 1, a unique mixed strategy "enter with probability q * while observing an unavailable PU band" that maximizes the social net benefit per time unit exists and is given by
By using a similar argument, the results for the case ρ ≥ 1 can be easily concluded and is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 6: In the considered CR system with ρ ≥ 1, a unique mixed strategy "enter with probability q * while observing an unavailable PU band" that maximizes the social net benefit per time unit exists and is given by
where x 2 and W 1 are given by (25) and (28), respectively.
VI. ADMISSION FEE
We have obtained the equilibrium strategy as well as the social optimization strategy of SUs when they are noncooperative or cooperative and can easily see that the individual's decision deviates from the socially preferred decision. That is, consideration of narrow self-interest usually does not lead to overall optimality. In practice, however, the equilibrium joining probability q e is often expected to coincide with the socially optimal joining probability q * . To induce individual optimizing SUs to behave in a socially optimal way, we first need to compare q e and q * . We have reached the following theorem, and the proof for this theorem is given in Appendix E.
Theorem 7: For the considered CR system, the equilibrium joining probability q e is not smaller than the socially optimal joining probability q * , i.e.,
Theorem 7 suggests that the equilibrium joining probability is greater than the socially optimal joining probability when arriving SUs find the PU band unavailable. It implies that if an SU has the right to behave independently without considering other SUs' welfare, it will have more incentive to join the orbit than if it is in a cooperative environment. This result may be interpreted as follows. When an arriving SU decides to enter the orbit, its decision increases the delay for other SUs. Such an effect is called negative externality. The SUs that independently maximize their own benefit ignore those negative externalities that they impose on the other SUs in the orbit and later arrivals, and thus, they tend to overuse the system. However, these externalities should be taken into account when all SUs cooperate with each other and aim to maximize the sum of benefits from service minus the waiting costs per time unit. As a result, in the latter case, fewer customers would join the system, leading to a less-congested system. The resulting equilibrium joining probability is therefore larger than the socially optimal joining probability.
To use the PU band more efficiently and to eliminate the difference between the equilibrium and the socially optimal strategies, the system administrator can impose a positive admission fee p for the SUs that decide to join the orbit (i.e., the reward for SUs that enter the orbit will be decreased to R − p from the original R in the noncooperative scenario). This way, self-aware SUs are expected to reduce their effective arrival rate. We analyze the scenario of ρ < 1 and offer Theorem 8. The proof for this theorem is given in Appendix F.
Theorem 8:
For the considered CR network with ρ < 1, there exists a positive admission fee p such that if it is imposed for each SU that joins the orbit, then the resulting equilibrium joining probability by replacing R with R−p in (16) will coincide with the socially optimal strategy in (24) and is given by
and T (0), T (1), W 1 , W 2 , and x 2 are, respectively, given by (18), (19) , (28), (29), and (25). For the opposite scenario ρ ≥ 1, the appropriate admission fee that makes the equilibrium and the socially optimal joining strategies coincide is given below by following a similar way.
Theorem 9: For the considered CR network with μβ ≤ λ(α + β), there exists a positive admission fee p such that if it is imposed for each SU that joins the orbit, then the resulting equilibrium joining probability will coincide with the socially optimal joining probability and is given by
where p * * , T (1), W 1 , and x 2 are, respectively, given by (33), (19) , (28), and (25).
Remark 3: The main concern of Theorems 8 and 9 is the impact of the admission fee on the performance of the individual SU and socially optimal strategies. In fact, the admission fee does not make any difference in the social benefit of SUs because the admission fee is merely a transfer payment from SUs to the system administrator. As p increases, fewer SUs will choose to enter the system due to the higher price imposed on their use of the PU band. Fig. 12 in Section VII shows that since the equilibrium strategy of SUs is a monotonic function of the admission fee, when p increases, there always exists a point that makes the equilibrium joining strategy coincide with the socially optimal strategy.
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Here, we will first investigate the effects of the parameters on the joining behavior of SUs via numerical experiments in noncooperative and cooperative cases. Specifically, we explore the sensitivity of the equilibrium, as well as the socially optimal joining probabilities of arriving SUs with respect to some main indicators of the system. Then, we demonstrate the impact of admission fee p on the equilibrium strategy and the social optimization strategy of SUs, which does improve the utilization efficiency of limited CR sources. Finally, we numerically compare results between our model and the model studied in [11] without random access (retrials) and then provide some explanations.
Figs. 3-8 describe how the equilibrium and socially optimal joining probabilities are affected by changing the values of parameters λ, μ, α, β, θ, and R. First of all, we can see that q * is smaller than q e in all these figures, which agrees with the statement of Theorem 7.
It is shown in Fig. 3 that both q e and q * are continuously monotonically decreasing in arrival rate λ. This is because when λ increases, arriving SUs that find the PU band unavailable will expect that the orbit is more loaded. As a consequence, they are less inclined to join the orbit and then retry for spectrum access to avoid paying more waiting costs. As in Fig. 4 , the strategic joining probabilities are increasing with respect to μ. It may be interpreted that an increasing service rate can serve the PU and SUs faster and thus benefit the SUs in the orbit by reducing their expected waiting time, regardless of whether they are noncooperative or cooperative. Fig. 5 shows the influence of the PU's arrival rate α on the joining strategies of SUs. It is observed that q e and q * are monotonically decreasing functions of α. This is due to the fact that with increasing α, the PU arrives and then interrupts the access of SUs more frequently. The preempted times during the generalized service time of an SU (from the beginning epoch of accessing the spectrum to when the SU's job is completed) are added, which prolongs the generalized service time of the SU as well as the waiting time of each SU in the orbit. Essentially, this causes an increase in the traffic load of the system and gives arriving SUs less incentive to join the orbit. Fig. 6 shows that when β increases, the arriving SUs prefer to join the orbit while observing an unavailable PU band due to the fact that the period that the PU occupies the PU band each time will not last much time. Similarly, in Fig. 7 , the joining probabilities increase as θ increases since the SUs in the orbit that retry more frequently will have more chances at being successful in their attempts to access the spectrum during the same period of time. Meanwhile, it is intuitive that the higher service reward R the SUs gain from service, the higher the waiting cost in the orbit they can afford. Therefore, the joining probabilities are increasing in R, which is shown in Fig. 8 .
Next, we analyze the impact of different parameters on the optimal individual and social benefit. Figs. 9-11 show the maximum social benefit. The social benefit increases with respect to reward R and decreases with respect to C in Fig. 9 , as one would expect. When λ increases in Fig. 10 , the social benefit as a whole also increases. However, the trend shows with respect to λ. The reason for this behavior is that the social benefit improves as all the arriving SUs will be served when the system is not crowded. However, when λ continues to increase, it is readily seen in Fig. 3 that the entrance probability decreases to 0 as every SU detecting the server is not idle wants to avoid the crowd. Although the SUs' optimal joining probabilities tend toward 0, this does not significantly affect the optimal social benefit since all arriving SUs enter the system with probability 1 when the server is idle, which contributes to the social benefit. In Fig. 10 , we can see that the social benefit decreases as α increases. The interruptions caused by PUs impose negative externalities on this system that result in fewer SUs entering the system due to longer delays. With regard to the parameters μ and θ in Fig. 11 , the social benefit is increasing, which is intuitive. The increasing of μ makes the server's efficiency increase; hence, more and more SUs will obtain the service as soon as possible. Moreover, more SUs in the retrial orbit will increase their chances at getting service successfully as θ increases. The proposed noncooperative and cooperative joining strategies are viewed from the perspective of individual rationality and social rationality, respectively. These two strategies incorporate the SUs' different behaviors in responding to the two different rationalities (i.e., to maximize their own benefit or the social benefit). When the SUs adopt noncooperative strategies, they only want to maximize their own benefit, regardless of others in the system. Even if there is little benefit to be gained, they still choose to enter the system. This is why the social resources are overused. To eliminate the gap between the individual equilibrium strategy and the social optimization strategy and regulate the SUs so that they behave in a social manner while utilizing the network resources, in Section VI, we introduce an admission fee for all SUs that decide to enter the system. Now, we analyze how the admission fee influences these two strategies (see Fig. 12 ). First, the fee does not make any difference to the social benefit because it is merely a transfer of payment from customers to the system administrator. Furthermore, as p increases, fewer SUs will choose to enter the system due to the higher admission fee imposed on their use of the PU band. As the equilibrium strategy of SUs is a monotonic function of the admission fee, when p increases, there always exists a point that makes the equilibrium joining strategy coincide with the socially optimal strategy. Finally, to illustrate the impact of the SUs' random access, we compare two different equilibrium entering probabilities in Figs. 13-17 between the model studied in [11] and our model in this paper. Note that the model [11] adopted was an FCFS discipline for blocked SUs other than a random access policy. To see the difference more clearly, we adapt our model slightly to the model in [11] and define q c as the equilibrium strategy of each arriving SU that is not able to sense the PU band's state, whereas the other assumptions are the same as in our paper. The explicit expression of q c can be easily obtained using the method in our paper; hence, we omit it and just provide the numerical results. To compare, let q b be the equilibrium joining probability of SUs that choose to enter the free spectrum in [11] , where the system is modeled by an FCFS queueing discipline. Obviously, what makes these two probabilities different is the retrial policy. We investigate the impact of retrial rate θ on the behavior of SUs that decide to enter the system in our model, whereas the results in [11] have nothing to do with the retrial rate. We obtain different numerical examples about equilibrium entering probabilities from these two models when varying parameters. It is clear that q c < q b in Figs. 13-17 , which suggests that the equilibrium SUs in our model are less willing to enter the system without an FCFS discipline, which means that each SU retrying for service must depend on the other SUs in the orbit. Our model with retrial SUs reflects the competition among SUs in the practical systems. However, the model in [11] with an FCFS discipline cannot reflect the competition among SUs since they are served in order, and no SU is affected by the other SUs behind it. An SU's expected waiting time only depends on how long the front SUs take. In other word, in our model, each SU in the orbit has the same probability to succeed in retrying for service. If there are n SUs in the orbit, each SU will succeed with probability 1/nθ. Thus, each SU should consider the other SUs' behavior in the retrial orbit regardless of when it comes, and an SU that joins the retrial group may cause future customers to spend more time in the system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper has provided an analysis of the noncooperative and cooperative joining behaviors of SUs in a CR system with a single PU band. This is the first time that the strategic behavior of SUs has been studied with a retrial phenomenon in the system from an economics point of view. Specifically, we derived the Nash equilibrium and socially optimal joining strategies of SUs. If the SUs are noncooperative, then their goal is to maximize their own welfare by ignoring the negative externalities that they impose on other SUs and, thus, perhaps overuse the system. From the viewpoint of the social planner, the social goal is to maximize the sum of benefits the society provides. Therefore, as shown in this discussion and the numerical experiments, the solution for the individual maximization problem is greater than the counterpart of the social maximization problem. To bridge the gap between the individually and socially optimal strategies, we propose that an appropriate admission fee be imposed on SUs that join the orbit, which may induce individually optimizing SUs to behave in a more socially optimal manner. APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Multiplying (1)- (4) by z j and summing up over all j, we derive the following basic equations after some algebraic manipulations:
Eliminating p 1 (z), p 2 (z), and p 3 (z) in (35)- (38), we obtain the following differential equation for p 0 (z):
Inserting z = 1 in the above equation, we have
Differentiating (39) and putting z = 1 yields
Putting z = 1 in (35)-(38) and taking into account (40) and the normalizing condition, i.e.,
we can get results (6)- (9) after some algebra.
By substituting (6) into (40), we obtain N 0 = p 0 (1) given by (10) . Differentiating (38) and evaluating it at point z = 1 yields N 3 = p 3 (1) given by (13) by substituting (9) and (10) . Differentiating (35) and evaluating it at point z = 1, we derive N 1 = p 1 (1) given by (11) by taking into account (6), (10), (13), and (41). Finally, differentiating (37) and evaluating it at point z = 1, we obtain N 2 = p 2 (1) given by (12) with the help of (8) and (11) .
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Due to the PASTA property, the probability that the SU observes the PU band is occupied by an SU, occupied by the PU with one preempted SU, or occupied by the PU with no preempted SU and j other SUs in the orbit coincides with the stationary probability p (1, j), p(2, j), or p(3, j) . Hence, the total arrival rate in the orbit is
On the other hand, the mean number of SUs in the orbit is
By applying Little's formula in the orbit, we obtain the mean waiting time of an SU that joins the orbit as
Finally, the proof of the statement that T (q), which is given by (42), is strictly increasing for q is elementary and is omitted here.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
When μβ > λ(α + β), S(q) is strictly decreasing for q ∈ [0, 1] and has a unique maximum, i.e.,
and a unique minimum, i.e.,
Therefore, when (R/C) < T (0), S(q) is negative for every q, the best response of an arriving SU is balking, and the unique equilibrium point is q e = 0, which gives the first branch of (16).
When T (0) ≤ (R/C) ≤ T (1), there exists a unique solution of the equation S(q) = 0, which lies in the interval [0,1] and gives the second branch of (16) .
When (R/C) > T (1), an arriving SU that joins the orbit gets a positive benefit for every q. In other words, the best response is 1 in this case. Thus, the choice of entering is the unique Nash equilibrium strategy, and we obtain the third branch of (16) .
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 5
The social benefit per time unit when all SUs follow a mixed policy 'enter with probability q while observing an unavailable PU band' is given by (23). We let x = (μβ/(α + β)) − λq, then (23) can be rewritten as a function of x, i.e.,
where A and B are given by (26) and (27), respectively. Therefore, the problem of maximizing
We now consider two cases.
, which implies that f (x) is strictly increasing in x, and the unique maximum is attained at x = μ/(1 + ρ 2 ). Thus, the best response of arriving SUs that find the PU band unavailable will join the orbit with probability q * = 0.
2 )/θ(1 + ρ 2 )) ⇔ A > 0. In this case, f (x) may not be monotonic in x always for x ∈ [(μ(1−ρ)/(1+ρ 2 )), (μ/(1+ρ 2 ))]. We solve the equation f (x) = 0 and obtain two roots, i.e.,
Therefore, f (x) is decreasing in (−∞, x 1 ) and (x 2 , +∞), respectively, and increasing in [x 1 , x 2 ]. Next, we discuss three subcases.
, and the unique maximum is attained at x = μ/(1 + ρ 2 ), i.e., q * = 0.
In this subcase, f (x) is unimodal for x ∈ [(μ(1−ρ)/(1+ρ 2 )), (μ/(1+ρ 2 ))]. Specifically, it is increasing for x ∈ [(μ(1 − ρ)/(1 + ρ 2 )), x 2 ] and decreasing for x ∈ [x 2 , (μ/(1+ρ 2 ))]. Hence, the optimal solution is x = x 2 , i.e., q * = (1/ρ)[1 − (x 2 (1 + ρ 2 )/μ)]. In other words, the optimal strategy of SUs when they find the PU band unavailable is to join with probability q * = (1/ρ)[1 − (x 2 (1 + ρ 2 )/μ)]. Case 2c: (μ(1−ρ)/(1+ρ 2 )) > x 2 ⇔ (R/C) > W 2 . In this subcase, f (x) is decreasing for x ∈ [(μ(1−ρ)/(1+ρ 2 )), (μ/(1 + ρ 2 ))]; hence, it takes its maximum at x = (μ(1−ρ)/(1+ρ 2 )), i.e., the best response is q * = 1.
Combining the given results in two cases by noting
we obtain the social optimization probability q * in the theorem statement.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 7
We just consider the case ρ < 1. The result for the opposite case ρ ≥ 1 holds by a similar way. Next, according to (16) and (24), it can be shown that T (0) < W 1 and T (1) < W 2 . Therefore, we only need to compare T (1) and W 1 in the following two cases. (ii) If W 1 ≤ T (1), we will also discuss five subcases. Hence, the inequality of (31) holds for any case.
APPENDIX F PROOF OF THEOREM 8
When the reward for SUs that join the orbit is changed from R to R − p, the social objective function is the same as (23) since the admission fee p is not included in the social objective function with a transfer of income from one social group (SUs) to another (the administrator of the system). Thus, the resulting socially optimal joining probability remains the same as (24). However, the equilibrium joining probability is changed to 
When (R/C) < W 1 , the socially optimal joining probability q * = 0. If we let p = C(W 1 − T (0)), then (R − p)/C < T (0), which is the condition that the equilibrium joining probability is 0. Therefore, p = C(W 1 − T (0)) is the appropriate admission fee that makes the equilibrium joining probability coincide with the socially optimal joining probability, which gives the first branch of (32).
In a similar way, we can obtain the third branch of (32). For the case W 1 ≤ (R/C) ≤ W 2 , the socially optimal joining probability is q * = (1/ρ)[1−(x 2 (1 + ρ 2 )/μ)]. If we let q ee = (1/ρ)[1−(x 2 (1+ρ 2 )/μ)], then p = p * * , which is given by (33). If such a fee is charged, T (0) ≤ ((R − p)/C) ≤ T (1). Due to the second branch of (51), the resulting equilibrium joining probability is reduced to (1/ρ)[1−(x 2 (1+ρ 2 )/μ)]. Thus, the equilibrium joining probability can coincide with the socially optimal joining probability by imposing for each SU that joins the orbit, which is given in the second branch of (32).
